The powers of problem definition: The case of government paperwork by Weiss, Janet A.
Policy Sciences 22: 97-121, 1989. 
9 1989 KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 
The powers of problem definition: The case of government paperwork 
JANET A. WEISS 
Institute of Public Policy Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, M148109-1220, U.S.A. 
Abstract. Problem definition is a package of ideas that includes, at least implicitly, an account 
of the causes and consequences of undesirable circumstances and a theory about how to 
improve them. As such, it serves as the overture to policymaking, as an integral part of the 
process of policymaking, and as a policy outcome. In each of these roles it seems to exert 
influence on government action. Distinguishing among the roles clarifies the nature of that 
influence. A case study examines the transition from one problem definition to another in the 
domain of information collection by the federal government. The rise of the Paperwork Reduc- 
tion definition illustrates the variety of ways in which problem definition has powerful con- 
sequences. 
Problem definition is widely regarded as the first stage of the policy cycle, a 
stage that lays fundamental groundwork for the ensuing struggle over the 
construction of useful policy alternatives, authoritative adoption of a policy 
choice, implementation, and assessment (Brewer and deLeon 1983). Defini- 
tion in this sense is not merely a label for a set of facts and perceptions. It is a 
package of ideas that includes at least implicitly an account of the causes and 
consequences of some circumstances that are deemed undesirable, and a 
theory about how a problem may be alleviated (Defy 1984, Gusfield 1981). 
By the frame imposed on circumstances, a problem definition highlights 
some aspects of the situation, throwing other aspects into shadow. It pushes 
forward some potential solutions, neglecting others (Gamson and Modigliani 
1987). 
The definition of problems at the outset of the policy process may have 
various sources: the lonely analyst wrestling to impose intellectual structure 
on a messy array of facts and dilemmas; savvy politicians crafting issues to 
appeal to the winning mix of voter demographics; a crisis event splashed 
across the front page to galvanize attention to previously neglected corners 
of social life; the insistence of disenfranchised groups that their concerns be 
taken seriously by those more comfortably circumstanced. Whatever the pre- 
cipitating factors, problem definition determines how people think about the 
problems that are (and are not) on the public agenda. 2 
I endorse the importance of the initial definition of the problem, as it has 
been typically considered in the policy literature. A problem definition at the 
outset of the policy process has implications for later stages: which kinds of 
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evidence bear on the problem, which solutions are considered effective and 
feasible, who participates in the decision process, how policies are imple- 
mented, and by which criteria policies are assessed. But in this article, I argue 
that problem definition is more than the overture to the real action; it is often 
at the heart of the action itself. 
As the policy process unfolds, problem definition may remain an open 
question. Although analysts prefer to settle on a given problem definition 
before proceeding with their work, the policy process does not require agree- 
ment on a problem definition before legislative or bureaucratic action ensues. 
As advocates seek to attract attention to new policy proposals, they may do 
so by proposing substitutes for the definitions guiding existing policies. As 
policymakers struggle through the process of authoritative decision making, 
they typically face not only multiple options for addressing a given problem, 
but multiple definitions each implying its own family of solutions. Multiple 
definitions may survive to haunt the implementation process, as differing 
conceptions of the problem guide the various actors who work to turn the 
official rhetoric into many realities (Katzmann, 1986). A common language 
of problem definition can be stitched together to permit coalitions to move 
forward one policy or another for a time (Edelman, 1988). Later, consensus 
unravels as circumstances change, competing definitions gain adherents, and 
new coalitions form. 
Problem definition cannot be definitively settled and locked in at the 
beginning. Sometimes problem definitions persist from start to finish, from 
year to year, even from generation to generation. But other times analysts, 
advocates, and policy makers continue to argue over problem definition as 
problems are introduced, evidence considered, solutions debated, decisions 
made, programs implemented, and policies evaluated. At whatever stage a 
new problem definition gains significant support, it shapes the ensuing 
action. It legitimates some solutions rather than others, invites participation 
by some political actors and devalues the involvement of others, focuses 
attention on some indicators of success and consigns others to the scrapheap 
of the irrelevant. To reap these rewards, participants in the policy process 
seek to impose their preferred definitions on problems throughout the policy 
process. Much policymaking, in fact, is preoccupied with whose definitions 
shall prevail. 
To illustrate these claims and their implications, I analyze the conflict over 
problem definition in one policy domain, the case of federal paperwork. The 
policy problem is quite simple. On one hand, federal officials who devise and 
operate complex policies to benefit a large, heterogeneous population have 
to know a great deal about the needs of the population and its responses to 
federal action. To find out, they collect information in standardized, written 
format from many sources at frequent intervals. Without such knowledge, 
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neither sensible federal programs nor democratic accountability would be 
possible (Weiss & Gruber, 1984). On the other hand, Americans are sus- 
picious of big government (Huntington, 1981). They resent the intrusion of 
public officials into private realms of action. They begrudge the costs of pro- 
viding detailed accounts of their activities to serve bureaucratic purposes. 
The clash of these two powerful pressures, one for more information and one 
for less, means that something has to give. 
Although the facts are straightforward, the problem definition is not. The 
tension between the need to know and the costs of finding out has been 
reconciled in two different ways over the last fifty years. During the period 
between the 1930's and 1974, the dominant problem definition gave primacy 
to the government's need for information. I call it the Government Intelli- 
gence definition. It highlighted the need for information to guide government 
action and to permit oversight by elected officials. It relegated the burdens of 
collection to the status of regrettable but minor inconveniences. After 1974 a 
second definition of the problem came to the fore. I call it the Paperwork 
Reduction definition. It directed attention to the significant burdens of 
paperwork on the public and the economy, and pooh-poohed the claims of 
government officials to need so much information. Something had to give. 
But what has given has depended on which definition of the problem was in 
vogue at the time. 
By looking at the transition from the Government Intelligence definition 
to the Paperwork Reduction definition, this paper considers the variety of 
ways in which problem definition exerts power in the policy process. It shows 
how policy actors struggle over problem definition throughout the policy 
process, how political context shapes problem definition, and how consensus 
on problem definition influences successive rounds of policymaking. The 
triumph of the Paperwork Reduction definition was a policy outcome of 
considerable significance, as important perhaps as the administrative and 
policy changes that it inspired and justified. By tracking the process and 
consequences of problem definition in this one policy process, the case 
suggests the complex roles of problem definition - as the intellectual frame- 
work that sets the context for policy deliberation, as the focus of political 
debate and advocacy in legislative and bureaucratic decision making, and as 
one of the ultimate products of policy action. 
The Government Intelligence definition 
Before the New Deal, there was little conflict between the need for informa- 
tion and the resistance to collecting it. The federal government simply did not 
collect much. But the New Deal legislation of 1933 dramatically increased 
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the need for data, and unleashed a wave of forms and surveys upon the land. 
Complaints from disgruntled respondents immediately followed. President 
Roosevelt and a newly-created Central Statistical Board attempted to 
respond to the complaints by eliminating cases in which several agencies 
requested the same information from the same sources (Commission on 
Federal Paperwork 1977a, Feldman 1970). The  complaints subsided 
through the 1930's, only to surge again when the onset of World War II 
triggered massive new data collection. The allocation of materials, selective 
service, production controls, and price controls all required substantial new 
information, which in turn required new data collection. This time the Con- 
gress stepped in to address the issue. 
The Federal Reports Act of 1942 (PL 77-831) established for the first 
time legal guidelines to permit the collection of necessary information and 
reduce the burdens of paperwork on the public. It permitted federal agencies 
to collect information that agency officials deemed necessary for the proper 
performance of agency business. It gave the Bureau of the Budget authority 
to review and clear all agency plans to collect information, except those from 
the Treasury Department (notably the Internal Revenue Service) and the 
bank regulatory agencies. Clearance was to be denied if some other agency 
was already collecting the same data or if the information request was 
patently improper (Office of Statistical Standards 1952). 
The definition of the problem implicit in the Federal Reports Act had 
several parts. First, federal officials appropriately decided what they needed 
to know. Second, citizen complaints about paperwork stemmed largely from 
the failure of citizens to appreciate the government's need for information to 
meet complex legal and political pressures. Third, unreasonable burden 
existed when two agencies asked the same firms or households for the same 
information. The dominant causal theory blamed unreasonable burden on 
fragmentation and lack of coordination among federal agencies. Thus the 
solution for unreasonable burden was to prevent two agencies from asking 
for the same information by coordinating requests from a central location. 
This set of ideas, which I call the Government Intelligence definition, was 
linked by its supporters to a handful of cultural symbols and values that 
bolstered its arguments. The importance of rationality and expertise in 
government decision making was the most obvious. But this definition also 
stood for due process, the protection of citizens against arbitrary or biased 
actions of government agencies that were not guided by systematic informa- 
tion. By blaming people for complaining about their obligations to provide 
information to the government, it emphasized the legitimacy of government 
claims on information about society. Its resonance with widely accepted 
values strengthened its claim to political acceptance among the policy makers 
and senior bureaucrats who were most directly involved. It placed protesters 
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at a disadvantage by casting their objections as illegitimate (Kaufman 1977). 
Although the Government Intelligence definition failed to make paper- 
work popular, it protected information collection for many years. Between 
the middle thirties and the middle seventies, the Bureau of the Budget con- 
tinued to approve nearly all requests for clearance of information collection. 
From time to time, congressional committees or other elected officials in- 
dignantly pointed to the jungle of paperwork perpetrated by the federal 
bureaucracy) But these bursts of ire were short lived. During the entire 
period, no efforts were made to change the Federal Reports Act procedure in 
any major way, nor were serious proposals put forward to address the 
burdens of information collection (Neustadt 1981). The consensus on the 
Government Intelligence definition held through the spurts in data collection 
that accompanied price controls during the Korean War, the wage and price 
guide posts of the Kennedy-Johnson era, and the 1971-73 freeze on prices 
followed by price controls. It held through Democratic and Republican 
administration, through periods of expansion and quiescence in government 
activity. But after 1974 it came undone. 
The Paperwork Reduction definition 
A new definition of the problem superseded the old by reinterpreting the 
tension between the benefits of having information and the costs of collecting 
it. Where Government Intelligence permitted federal officials to decide what 
they needed to know, the Paperwork Reduction definition assumed that 
federal bureaucrats left to their own devices would ask for too much. 
Congress, with its more refined political sensibilities, had a better capacity to 
balance legitimate needs for information against the burdens on citizens. This 
definition interpreted complaints about paperwork as legitimate concerns of 
aggrieved citizens, not as a failure of citizens to fulfill legitimate obligations. 
'Unreasonable burden' existed whenever agencies sought to collect informa- 
tion beyond that required by the Congress. The causal theory blamed un- 
reasonable burden on uncontrolled bureaucratic imperialism and the per- 
verse incentives that allowed bureaucrats to enjoy the benefits of information 
while shifting the costs to respondents. The solution for burden was to adjust 
the incentive structure, to require agencies to pay a higher 'price' for informa- 
tion they wished to collect by creating demanding standards for clearance 
and a cap on total burden that each agency was permitted to impose (OMB 
1979, 1981). 
The Paperwork Reduction definition was translated into action through a 
series of administrative reforms and executive orders between 1975 and 
1979. With the support and prodding of the Congress, Presidents Ford and 
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Carter pursued it enthusiastically. During this period, the Office of Manage- 
ment and Budget pursued a Forms Reduction Program to cut the number of 
federal reports, changed its criteria for approving information collection by 
the agencies, began a Burden Reduction Program to reduce the number of 
hours spent completing federal forms, created an Information Collection 
Budget to limit information requests from the agencies to a fixed annual 
number, ordered sunset provisions on all reports so that each form would 
have to be reviewed at regular intervals, and required agencies to restrict data 
collection from small enterprises. In 1980 these initiatives were ratified in the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, which repealed the Federal Reports Act 
of 1942 and substituted the language and ideas of the new problem defini- 
tion. 
Like its predecessor, the Paperwork Reduction definition evoked a set of 
cultural symbols and values. Its advocates discussed data collection in terms 
of intrusion of government into private matters of family and business, sus- 
picion of centralized authority, skepticism about the competence and good 
will of federal bureaucrats, and the importance of individual freedom from 
surveillance. As these values were woven into arguments about policy toward 
information, they lent emotional punch to the logic of paperwork Reduction. 
The transition from Government Intelligence to Paperwork Reduction 
Problem definition in public policy is both important and elusive because it is 
embedded in such complex structures for decision and implementation. The 
ideas carried by Government Intelligence and Paperwork Reduction became 
influential because they took hold in several loosely connected communities 
of elites: political appointees in agencies (notably OMB and the General 
Accounting Office (GAO)) with a government-wide orientation, Congres- 
sional staff of committees responsible for government operations, lobbyists 
for business and state and local governments, and elected officials in Con- 
gress and the White House. The domestic policy arena is composed of many 
of these communities, each with its own perspectives and interests. But all 
need at least some of the others to flourish. To understand problem defini- 
tion as a political process, an analyst must track how ideas about public 
policy travel across communities and institutions of policy making. 
Two harbingers of the transition in problem definition appeared in 1974. 
Shortly after assuming the Presidency in August, Gerald Ford placed regula- 
tory reform high on his policy agenda (Ford 1979). Over time, he included 
paperwork reduction as a feature of desirable deregulation. In December, 
Congress created a Commission on Federal Paperwork (PL 93-556) to 
consider ways to measure and minimize the paperwork burden on non- 
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federal respondents. From these modest beginnings, the Paperwork Reduc- 
tion definition infiltrated the policy process. It resulted in significant changes 
in official policy and bureaucratic practice that could not have occurred 
under the old definition. However there was nothing inevitable about the 
change in problem definition. Nothing in this analysis suggests that the forces 
culminating in problem redefinition were unstoppable. This discussion points 
out the process that made redefinition more likely, not the mechanisms that 
escorted paperwork reduction to its place in destiny. 
President Ford's policy agenda during his years in office was dominated by 
inflation, recession, and the aftermath of OPEC's oil embargo. Like most 
presidents, he had little time for discretionary issues (Light 1982). But he 
made one issue distinctly his own - regulatory reform. In October 1974 he 
addressed a joint session of Congress on the subject. Throughout 1975 and 
1976 regulatory reform was a frequent topic of Ford's speeches and legis- 
lative initiatives. To Ford's chagrin, many of these initiatives were stymied in 
Congress and in the independent regulatory agencies. But paperwork proved 
to be a vehicle for regulatory reform over which the White House had con- 
siderable control. In speeches and public meetings, he repeatedly linked 
paperwork to regulatory relief. In July 1975, he told the Commission on 
Federal Paperwork: 
Freedom will depend in part on our ability to preserve individuality and to 
avoid a government so large and bureaucratic that it stifles initiative. That 
is one reason I have taken a personal interest in the problems associated 
with the collection of information by government... The more than 5000 
different forms which individual citizens are forced to fill out generates 
more than two billion pieces of paperwork each year. And that's too 
much... (Ford 1975a). 
In a speech to small business owners, he declared: 
I want an end to unnecessary, unfair, and unclear regulations and to need- 
less paperwork. The number of different federal forms sent out by 
Washington at last count totalled 5146. America is being buried in an 
avalanche of paperwork (Ford 1975b). 
To the US Chamber of Commerce, he explained his support for the Commis- 
sion on Federal Paperwork: 
I intend to see that its very wide powers are used effectively to cut down 
the unnecessary burden on our American free enterprise system (Ford 
1975c). 
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Although Ford's economic advisors were focused on pro-competitive de- 
regulation, Ford himself kept coming back to paperwork. In an unprece- 
dented White House meeting with the heads of the independent regulatory 
agencies, he asked them to reduce by 10% the number of forms that they 
used (White House Press Office 1976). His speeches, especially those to 
business audiences, referred to the 'nightmare, the 'increasing fide, the 'red 
tape jungle" the 'paperwork mountain; the 'growing suffocation; and the 
'avalanche of paper.' A series of public forums organized by the White House 
in the fall of 1975 elicited a slew of well-publicized complaints about govern- 
ment red tape (Domestic Council 1975). In March 1976 Ford ordered the 
executive agencies to cut by 10% the number of forms they used before June 
30 (Ford 1976a). When they did so (often by stapling several short forms 
together to make one longer report), he asked them to cut the amount of time 
required to fill out the forms by 7 million hours (Oaxaca 1976). In September 
1976, he asked for an additional reduction of 20 million hours of burden 
(Ford 1976b). His Director of the Office of Management and Budget revised 
the criteria for clearance of agency requests to collect information (OMB 
1976). Now the information to be collected had to be necessary for the 
proper performance of the agency's function, not available elsewhere, and 
have 'practical utility.' This meant the agency had to show how it could and 
would use the information once it had it. 
Ford was the most prominent, but not the only advocate of Paperwork 
Reduction. Also active during 1975-76 was a small group of  Congressmen 
and Senators who adopted paperwork as one of their issuesJ Before the 
Ford administration, Government Intelligence was firmly entrenched in 
Congress. Although conservatives fulminated on the sins of bureaucrats, only 
the small business committees ever used the language of paperwork reduc- 
tion, and they had no jurisdiction. The House Committee on Post Office and 
Civil Service, no hotbed of liberal activism, released biennial reports on the 
'Statistical Activities of the Federal Government.' The 1971 report read: 
With each succeeding year, there is growing recognition of the need for 
better statistical information on which to base decisions required to 
conduct modern government and business activities. The increasing 
magnitudes and complexities of present-day government and society in 
general appear to require more accurate and pertinent data, which is 
dramatically represented in the total statistical expenditures of over $491 
million... (Committee on Post Office and Civil Service 1971). 
During the midseventies, however, paperwork reduction became increasingly 
popular, most importantly in the House and Senate conunittees on Govern- 
ment Operations. After 1974, hearings emphasizing the burdens of paper- 
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work were held every year in both Houses. Individual members began to 
introduce bills that borrowed language from Ford's speeches. One bill 
proposed that, if OMB could not exercise firm control over the agencies, 
then GAO should do the clearance (S 1812). Another proposed that each 
Congressional committee review and prune all reporting requirements of 
agencies within its jurisdiction (S 3076). A third proposed an income tax 
credit for each respondent who completed a federal form of 10, 20, or 30 
cents for each item of information (HR 11983). Individual Senators and 
Representatives sought to reduce information collection in particular policy 
areas: hearings on 'Paperwork requirements of the Pension Reform Act' or a 
bill on Customs Paperwork Reduction Act. Others addressed the issue 
across the government: Government Forms Justification Amendments 
(S 2443, 1975), Form Reform Act (S 2132, 1975), Efforts to Reduce 
Federal Paperwork (Hearings 1975), Paperwork Review and Limitation Act 
of 1976 (S 3076), and so on. Although Congress did not act in any author- 
itative way at this stage, the ideas of Paperwork Reduction were clearly 
receiving serious attention. 
Meanwhile the Commission on Federal Paperwork that had been estab- 
lished in 1974 was proving to be another source of effective advocacy. 
Althoug it was a conventional study commission, with no particular authority 
or resources, it proved strikingly successful at promoting Paperwork Reduc- 
tion within the Congress. The Commission was composed of four members 
of Congress, the Comptroller General, and representatives from state and 
local government, business and consumer groups. 
The Commission took several steps to elaborate and legitimize the 
emerging paperwork reduction definition. First the staff worked hard to 
develop quantitative indicators of paperwork burden. The indicator used by 
the Federal Reports Act (i.e. the number of reports) was not sufficiently 
exciting. The Commission worked up several alternatives; the number of 
sheets of paper and the height of a stack of government forms were two early 
efforts (Commission on Federal Paperwork 1976). But in the end they came 
up with a politically compelling number. The final report concluded that 
'more than $100 billion a year, or about $500 for each person in the country, 
is spent on federal paperwork... A substantial portion of this cost is unneces- 
sary.' (Commission on Federal Paperwork 1977b.) Even if no one had a clue 
what all that paperwork was, or what portion was unnecessary, $100 billion 
was self-evidently too much. The number was frequently invoked as the 
Administration and Congress worked on the problem. 
The Commission also published 36 reports and a raft of position papers 
that made 770 detailed recommendations to the executive branch and the 
Congress about steps to reduce unnecessary paperwork. Although some of 
these were quite general (for example, that Congress should exercise more 
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oversight over information collection by agencies), many were detailed (for 
example that OMB should accept a single annual certification by a Mayor as 
evidence of local compliance with federal policies that are conditions of 
federal grants). The Commission held public hearings in 19 cities. It set up a 
Paperwork Hot Line that received 3500 complaints. Commissioners and 
Commission staff testified repeatedly (and successfully) before Congress to 
encourage adoption of their recommendations. For example, a proposal to 
cut back filling of IRS Form 941 from quarterly to annually passed both 
Houses in December 1975. Over the protests of the Department of Labor, 
which pointed out that state governments relied on these reports, President 
Ford signed the bill. The Commission articulated pragmatic strategies that 
transformed paperwork reduction from a political slogan into feasible and 
respectable proposals with a patina of expertise. 
By the time the Commission published its reports, Jimmy Carter was 
sitting in the White House. Having campaigned against big government, he 
consolidated the shift that Ford had begun. At his first cabinet meeting, he 
asked his senior appointees to cut red tape. He followed up with a memo 
asking each cabinet member to get 'personally involved' in reducing paper- 
work (Carter 1977). His OMB reissued the guidelines that Ford's OMB had 
circulated five months earlier asking for a reduction of 7 million hours of 
paperwork burden (Lance 1977). When the Commission on Federal Paper- 
work released its findings, OMB was under strict instructions to implement 
the recommendations. Carter asked for progress reports every six months on 
how many recommendations had been followed (OMB 1978). 
In 1979 White House staff convened a working group of Congressional 
staff and OMB officials to draft Executive Order 12174 to strengthen OMB's 
powers to restrict the collection of information by federal agencies (Neustadt 
1981). The Executive Order called for an annual budget that would give each 
agency a fixed number of burden-hours to 'spend' each year to collect the 
information it needed. It tightened up the official criteria for clearance by 
requiring agencies to show exactly how they intended to use the data they 
requested. Additional provisions made clearance criteria more stringent for 
data collection from small business and for recurring reports. Although 
President Carter enthusiastically signed the executive order in November, he 
also pushed for legislative changes. The Congressional supporters of Paper- 
work Reduction were eager to cooperate. Those Representatives and 
Senators who had served on the Commission on Federal Paperwork joined 
forces with members of the Government Operations committees. By 1980 
the Paperwork Reduction Act moved swiftly through committee to the floor. 
It passed overwhelmingly in December. Five cabinet secretaries pleaded with 
Carter not to sign it on the grounds that it would make their jobs harder. In 
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his signing statement, Carter exulted 'we've addressed the bureaucrats and 
we've won' (Neustadt 1981). 
The Paperwork Reduction Act repealed the Federal Reports Act, and 
institutionalized the Paperwork Reduction definition. It set into law many of 
the provisions of Executive Order 12174. It brought all agencies of the 
federal government under its scope, ending the exemptions of the IRS and 
the regulatory agencies. It instructed OMB to reduce by 25% the hours of 
burden caused by paperwork. The problem redefinition was complete. When 
Ronald Reagan took office a month later, the conceptual, legal and admin- 
istrative apparatus was in place 'to cut away most of the underbrush of paper- 
work burden.' (OMB 1985). 
The promoters of Paperwork Reduction had framed their case in a way 
that discouraged opposition. The senior bureaucrats who were direct bene- 
ficiaries of Government Intelligence immediately conceded the legitimacy of 
paperwork reduction concerns, and focused their energies on protecting 
themselves from its implications. Many bureaucrats argued that burden 
reduction was, of course, desirable, but the information they collected was 
necessary. For example, the head of the Energy Research and Development 
Administration testified in 1976: 
The Paperwork Review and Limitation Act would impose the laudable 
goal of reducing the number and complexity of forms used by the federal 
government in compiling data... However imposition of these stringent 
procedural road-blocks to information acquisition could severely hinder 
achievement of our goals. (Committee on Government Operations 1976.) 
And the Central Intelligence Agency sang the same tune in 1979: 
The Intelligence Community fully supports these legislative objectives [of 
paperwork reduction]. However the bills contain several provisions which 
would impact adversely on the Intelligence Community in the conduct of 
its foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence missions. (Senate 
Report 96-930, 1980). 
Speaking for the statistical community in 1975, the chief statistician in the 
federal government wrote: 
Information is needed; to get information, questions must be asked; to 
answer questions is a burden and that is the circle of the present paper- 
work predicament. While we all complain bitterly about government 
paperwork, we also complain about lack of information when critical 
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decisions are to be made. We still recall, for example, the intense criticism 
of the government's lack of information about energy..,  during the oil 
embargo. (Duncan 1975). 
These arguments tried to incorporate burden into Government Intelligence 
without surrendering entirely to the new definition. They failed. Suggestions 
that the problem had two sides were easily overwhelmed by one-sided 
language about the 'growing suffocation' of the economy by 'mountains' of 
paperwork. Hence the advocates of Paperwork Reduction found few ardent 
defenders of the old definition in their path. Although Government Intel- 
ligence had been widely embraced and long established in public policy, its 
support turned out to be an inch deep. 
Together a handful of players - Ford, Carter, several Congressmen and 
Senators, and the Commission on Federal Paperwork - redefined the paper- 
work problem for the entire federal government in a few short years. The 
features of the problem that they highlighted were not new; they had been 
lying around for years with scant political impact. The entrepreneurs focused 
attention on the costs of collecting information, directing attention away from 
the benefits. They advanced a new causal theory that blamed burden on 
bureaucrats rather than citizens. And they connected information policy to a 
different set of cultural values and symbols. By dramatizing this package of 
ideas, they spread the Paperwork Reduction definition through the com- 
munities of policymakers who used and collected government information. 
Connections between political context and problem definition 
Why was this problem redefined in the mid-seventies rather than earlier, 
later, or not at all? Which features of institutional, political, or social context 
made this problem definition appealing across institutional boundaries? This 
section considers three influences on this process: the objective features of 
the problem; the emergence of policy entrepreneurs; and fluctuations in the 
appeal of political symbols and language. 
Changes in the problem. The advocates of policies to reduce paperwork often 
justified their proposals by the 'growing suffocation of federal paperwork' 
(Ford 1976). Obviously sudden or unprecedented increases in the burdens of 
information collection might account, at least in part, for sudden increases in 
enthusiasm for reducing the burdens. In spite of the rhetoric, there is little 
evidence that the burdens of paperwork were growing. 
The only indicator of burden that was measured routinely and systemati- 
cally between 1942 and the mid-70's was the number of reports approved by 
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the Bureau of the Budget (later the Office of Management and Budget) under 
the Federal Reports Act procedure. OMB documents show that the number 
remained remarkably stable at about 5000 reports a year during this 35 year 
period. Peaks in 1944, 1952, 1963, and 1973 were due to the imposition of 
economic controls. In each case, large drops followed the removal of the 
controls. The 1944-45 drop was 6300 to 5000; in 1952-53 it was 5900 to 
4800; in 1963-64 it was 5200 to 4600; in 1973-74 it was 5700 to 5000. 
(OMB 1978). 
A better measure than number of reports is number of hours required to 
complete the reports (Commission on Federal Paperwork 1977c). OMB 
began to keep track of reporting hours beginning in 1968. The 110 million 
hours devoted to federal reports in 1968 increased to 130 million in 1971 
and to 168 million in 1973. However by 1974 the total had dropped back to 
122 million hours, paralleling the drop in number of reports (OMB 1978). 
Thus the embrace of a new problem definition in the 1974-76 period was 
not obviously triggered by a sudden or unprecedented increase in measur- 
able burden. Although it is conceivable that the agencies exempted from the 
Federal Reports Act had dramatically stepped up their collection of informa- 
tion, no systematic evidence of this entered into Congressional deliberations. 
The available measures showed that burden was approximately what it had 
been for the entire postwar period. The increases in the early seventies were 
no sharper than those of the early fifties or sixties, and the trend had already 
turned markedly downward when the President and Congress took up the 
problem. Nor did any crisis event bring paperwork reduction to the fore. If 
information collection was a problem in 1974, it had probably been a 
problem of about the same magnitude for many years. 
Pol i  o ' entrepreneurs .  Problems often come to seem important because of the 
activities of sponsors who promote favored solutions to problems in part by 
emphasizing the importance of the problems themselves (Kingdon 1984). 
These advocates impress on policymakers the need for action to pave the 
path to acceptance of the policy or program to address the need. In classic 
fashion, the policy entrepreneurs in this case promoted paperwork reduction 
policies by stressing the damage wrought by information collection. 
Ford, Carter, and the other policy entrepreneurs were not the first to 
advocate the Paperwork Reduction view. Others had attacked federal paper- 
work over the years, but in the past these attacks had been scattered and in- 
effectual. After all, the issue is not intrinsically glamorous or exciting. The 
arcane operations of the bureaucracy stir little interest beyond the Beltway. 
The issue did not turn out the vote of broad-based interest groups. The pre- 
decessors to the paperwork entrepeneurs of the 1970's had been unable to 
attract the attention of issue-oriented communities of policy makers in Con- 
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gress and the executive agencies. The entrepreneurs of the 70's succeeded. 
Part of the success lay in the personal involvement of the President of the 
U.S. and part lay in the new receptivity of the audiences. The political climate 
had changed, making it easier for the new set of policy entrepreneurs to be 
heard. 
Political context and political symbols. When many ideas compete for the 
attention of policy makers, the winners are determined not only by the 
relative merit of the ideas, but also by the preoccupations of the policy 
makers. These preoccupations are determined partly by the events of the 
moment, and partly by the institutional structure in which policy makers live. 
Both events and institutional structure in the mid-seventies created pre- 
occupations that were receptive to the arguments in the Paperwork Reduc- 
tion definition of the problem. 
The years 1974 to 1976 marked a tumultuous period in American politics. 
The end of the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandals highlighted the 
public's loss of confidence in the institutions of national government. The 
inflation-recession roller-coaster eroded confidence in economic policy Dis- 
illusion with social programs crept into political debate. Among policy 
makers and among citizens, enthusiasm for big government began to wear 
thin. 
Public opinion, however, seldom translates neatly into crisp official 
response. Elected officials have to interpret the public mood to mean that 
some symbols and principles are important to voters and others are not. 
Because the evidence about public preferences on matters of policy is nearly 
always ambiguous, politicians tend to look at the deep structure of public 
opinion, the handful of themes and ideas that seem to matter to people at the 
moment (Bennett et al. 1976). This handful of currently prominent themes is 
drawn from the inventory of themes and symbols acceptable in the main- 
stream political culture. The diversity and internal tensions within the 
inventory allow for a variety of 'national moods' to be created from the 
relatively modest pool of symbols (Elder and Cobb 1983). For example, 
norms of individual freedom may conflict with norms about the individual's 
obligations to the collective good, but both themes remain part of the cultural 
repertoire. As the society moves through periods in which one is dominant, 
the less popular idea disappears only from the current debate, not from the 
culture altogether. Eventually, the focus of attention shifts (Downs ]972). 
This complexity and cyclicity present frequent openings for defining and 
redefining problems. 
During the middle seventies, politicians and pundits understood the drop 
in public confidence in government to mean that some values had fallen from 
favor while others were on the rise. Of interest for information policy, the 
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value of rationality and due process in government decision making seemed 
to be badly shaken by the public's view of widespread incompetence and 
corruption in Washington. This view raised the salience of other symbols, 
especially individual freedom from government intrusion and fear of cen- 
tralized authority (Cohen 1976). Whether this was an accurate reading of the 
public mind is beside the point. Politicians across party and ideological lines 
believed that citizens now, more than before, wanted to limit government 
intervention and wanted to restrict the discretion of government officials 
(Sundquist 1976). 
Political events in Washington during the early seventies reinforced the 
politicians' suspicion of the federal bureaucracy. During the Nixon years, 
Congress grew mistrustful of undue politicization among senior agency 
officials. Ford and his successors distrusted bureaucrats who disregarded 
direction from the White House. Carter came to office on anti-government 
platform. Thus many politicians shared the public mood out of direct and 
concrete experiences in their own work. 
Nearly all policy issues, even the narrow and technical, become framed in 
symbolic terms as they work through the political process, and must be 
contested in those terms (Gamson and Modigliani 1987). Skillful advocates 
hook their preferred policies to symbols that are powerful and resonate with 
the largest possible audience (Edelman 1988). They back off from those that 
have apparently become unpopular. Paperwork Reduction was easy to justify 
with the newly ascendant symbols of disenchantment and government 
restraint. In comparison, Government Intelligence, with its ties to rationality, 
lost symbolic punch. As a result the proponents of the Paperwork Reduction 
definition found that their message penetrated as never before. Policy entre- 
preneurs then set to work to translate this 'new' issue into concrete legislative 
and administrative proposals. These proposals escalated toward stricter and 
more complex controls as officials competed to promote appealing symbols. 
The Paperwork Reduction definition became broadly acceptable in part 
because the receptivity to its arguments became remarkably broad. Be- 
cause domestic policymaking is fragmented, +semi-autonomous institutions 
develop their own norms and styles of interpretation of policy issues (Hey- 
mann 1987). This tends to make consensus on problem definition difficult to 
accomplish. For one idea to triumph over its competitors, it must take hold 
among groups that vary considerably in the respect they accord to any partic- 
ular argument. In this sense, structural fragmentation militates against 
consensus. But even modest interdependence creates channels for shared 
interpretations of reality. When one committee in Congress sees things one 
way while another committee sees them differently, each must reckon with 
the other's judgments in order to emerge with collective decisions. When 
policymakers in legislative and executive branches have shared experiences 
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over a long period of time and expect to work together in the future, these 
common experiences and expectations also contribute to the emergence of 
shared interpretations, s In this case policymakers in Congress, the White 
House, OMB and GAO came to share a skepticism about federal bureau- 
crats, a protective stance toward individual privacy, a loss of faith in the 
efficacy of federal intervention that paved the way to wide acceptance of the 
Paperwork Reduction definition. 
In the climate of the time, each group's interests could be advanced 
through the Paperwork Reduction definition. The President and the White 
House could use paperwork reduction as movement toward reform of exces- 
sive regulation, as a gesture of support for small business (an important 
constituency for Ford and Carter), and as a vehicle for control over the 
executive agencies. OMB and GAO officials, who serve as intermediaries 
between elected officials and the bureaucracy, had special insight into the 
excesses of the bureaucracy. They welcomed additional leverage to curb what 
they saw as defensive and imperialistic tendencies of agency officials 
(Committee on Government Operations 1980). The staff of the Government 
Operations committees in the House and Senate were eager to pursue an 
issue that promised visibility in the media and in the rest of the Congress. The 
Senators and Representatives who promoted Paperwork Reduction used 
their expertise and advocacy to raise their standing with the White House 
and with the business and education interest groups who supported the 
concept. For the Republicans, paperwork was also a device to restrict the 
expansionist tendencies of the executive agencies. For the Democrats, paper- 
work was a place to stand against the excesses of big government without 
opposing domestic programs. For all the groups, a further appeal of Paper- 
work Reduction was its bipartisan support. Policy proposals that do not 
automatically trigger partisan wrangling are rewarding because they are more 
likely to be adopted. Policymakers thus get a fix of real influence. 
The shift in political context alone could not have led to the change in 
problem definition without the advocacy of policy entrepreneurs. Entre- 
preneurship appears to be a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for 
redefinition. But the activities of the advocates must be sensitive to multiple 
institutional realities and adapted to the fluctuating currency of political 
symbols to have much hope of success. 
Problem definition as the overture to pol icymaking 
In the lore of policy analysis, problem definition rightfully assumes great 
importance. Analysts tend to agree that artful definitions of policy problems 
are essential to the production of useful advice and the development of 
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feasible solutions. After the analysts have moved on to new analyses, the 
problem definition may or may not take hold among policy makers. If it does 
take hold, it may or may not lead to changes in decisions, institutions, or 
behavior. In this tradition, problem definition is the be~nning of a process 
with many possible ramifications. 
If the redefinition of the information/paperwork problem was the first 
stage of policy making, what happened next? The change in definition from 
Government Intelligence to Paperwork Reduction made it possible for the 
information policies of the federal government to change in ways that earlier 
would have seemed odd and off the point. The American people have 
realized up to 300 million hours of paperwork burden reductions (OMB 
1985, GAO 1984). As the Federal Reports Act gave way to the Paperwork 
Reduction Act, federal agencies lost considerable control over their access to 
information (Caudle 1988). What they lost, OMB gained. In the hands of a 
powerful and politicized OMB, this control has offered considerable leverage 
over the activities of the federal government in a variety of domestic arenas 
(Hopkins 1986). Such changes in policy, program, and administrative pro- 
cedure took four to seven years to catch up with the preceding change in 
problem definition, in the face of weak to nonexistent opposition. Obviously, 
problem definition does not lead directly or automatically to subsequent 
policy. Given political institutions designed to check and balance, policy 
making and implementation in this case responded sluggishly and erratically 
to new ways of of understanding policy problems. But respond they did. 
Problem definition in the process of policymaking 
In this case, I have examined the interplay between defining problems and 
acting on them. This is a dynamic process in which intellectual understanding 
and institutional behavior guide one another over time. Unlike the one-way 
picture in which problem definitions sets the political process in motion and 
then fades from view, this perspective highlights the on-going power of 
problem definition. 
For a new problem definition to take hold, it has to flow through the major 
arteries of the policy making arena. These arteries are not always easy to find 
or to penetrate. Although some policy sub-systems or issue networks are 
highly developed with well-known membership and regular interaction 
(Heclo 1978, Sabatier 1988), others are not. Those who construct and 
promote problem definitions benefit from creativity about the potential 
membership of such subsystems. In the case of government paperwork, as for 
many domestic issues, the policy arena consisted of a set of fragmented, 
diverse communities that did not routinely act in concert. Each community 
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of policy makers and experts brought its own perspectives, incentives, and 
interests to bear on the question of when and how to collect information. 
Each had historical commitments to certain ways of thinking about informa- 
tion and routines for obtaining information. Each was organized around its 
own expectations about when and how information would be collected. 
The advocates of a new problem definition needed to span institutional 
arenas - here, the senior civil servants, the pertinent Congressional com- 
mittees, business interest groups, OMB and GAO. Only advocates who 
could find common ground across these diverse interests stood any chance 
to move forward their preferred definition. The discovery of common 
ground required some historical perspective on the positions adopted by 
various players and the values that those players might be willing to endorse, 
and an astute assesment of how opposing points of view would be defended. 
In a sense the advocates were engaged in the creation of a new issue net- 
work organized around the new definiticn. They promoted their problem 
definition by skillfully nurturing a supportive coalition, and were able to 
build their coalition because they had articulated a definition that organized 
the thinking and values of a diverse set of potential allies at that political 
moment. 
Once they had succeeded in several of these communities, the advocates 
discovered that problem definitions may accumulate momentum. Small wins 
in a few places, such as the White House and the Government Operations 
committees, created pressure on contiguous communities, such as OMB and 
GAO, to fall into line. The patient accretion of consent to an overarching 
definition lays the groundwork for victories at later stages of policymaking 
and implementation. 
Problem definitions must accommodate political realities, but they also 
help to create those realities. Although the pressures of institutional interests 
restrict the range of definitions that receive serious consideration, problem 
definitions carve new channels in institutional arrangements. For example, 
OMB's earlier deference (in information matters) to the greater expertise in 
the agencies was replaced by its vigorous attacks on agency practice. 
Derthick's (1979) superb discussion of the definition of social security policy 
as a series of technical questions about social insurance provides another 
illustration of how problem definition redistributes power among partici- 
pants in the policy process. 
Problem definition as the outcome of policymaking 
Finally, this case illustrates the importance of problem definition as a policy 
outcome in its own right. Problem definition creates language for talking 
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about problems and non-problems that draws attention to some features of 
social life at the expense of others, locates responsibility for problems, 
putting some groups on the defensive and others on the offensive, widens and 
deepens public or elite interest in particular social phenomena, and mobilizes 
political participation around issues or symbols highlighted by the problem 
definition. 
Language. The Paperwork Reduction definition changed the language used 
to talk about the information practices of federal agencies. All standardized 
questions are now officially called 'paperwork'. This includes tax forms, 
census questions, surveys, applications for benefits, monitoring and evalua- 
tion reports, record keeping requirements, grant proposals, loan and in- 
surance applications, etc. When firms, households, state or local govern- 
ments or nonprofit organizations respond to federal requests for informa- 
tion, they incur 'burden,' even when they initiate the interaction by applying 
for benefits or requesting assistance. The clear message of such language 
erodes the legitimacy of the request for information and signals that citizens 
appropriately feel aggrieved by the request. The words even derogate the 
government action that triggers burdensome requests for information. These 
seemingly minor changes in language and procedure work subtly and per- 
vasively to undermine the bonds of obligation between citizens and the 
state. 6 Although paperwork is not the only vehicle for examining the rela- 
tionship between government officials and citizens, it is a potent one. 
Through the Internal Revenue Service and Social Security Administration 
alone, federal paperwork touches the lives of the vast majority of citizens. 
Just by changing the officially sanctioned language from Government Intel- 
ligence to Paperwork Reduction, the new problem definition created a subtle 
yet significant difference in the aspects of government activity that attracted 
public attention, applause, and opprobrium. 
Responsibility. The Paperwork Reduction definition changed the allocation 
of blame and credit for the costs and benefits of data collection by federal 
agencies. Under the Government Intelligence definition, information was a 
good thing for government to have; hence information collection by bureau- 
crats (with a few exceptions) was good. Those groups who complained about 
the burdens of information collection were put on the defensive, and had to 
surmount the presumption that the burdens were not weighty enough to 
overcome the natural benefits of intelligence. Under the Paperwork Reduc- 
tion definition, the tables were turned. The bureaucrats now had to surmount 
the presumption that they should not burden citizens. Respondents who 
complained about burden were now assumed to be right. 
The shift in responsibility is obvious in the growing defensiveness of the 
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executive agencies throughout the 1970's. In their testimony before Con- 
gress, senior agency officials repeatedly argued that their agency had partic- 
ularly important needs for information that justified the burdens they 
imposed. Many agencies opposed the passage of the Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1980 in spite of the President's support. The shift is also obvious in 
the growing activism of interest groups opposed to paperwork. The new 
problem definition gave considerable ammunition to groups such as the 
National Federation of Independent Business, Chamber of Commerce, 
Business Advisory Council on Federal Reports, Council of Chief State 
School Officers, and the newly organized Citizen's Committee on Paperwork 
Reduction. The ammunition was put to good use as these groups mobilized 
their members to oppose specific federal reports and to support tighter 
central restrictions on information collection. 
Awareness. The Paperwork Reduction definition stimulated interest among 
politicians in a policy area that had previously been an obscure and routine 
matter with few partisan implications and no excitement. Although Govern- 
ment Intelligence relied on a package of concepts, symbols, and theories, the 
symbols of rationality and due process had lost much of their political 
glamour. Before 1974, few elected officials chose to master the details of 
information policies or to cultivate the natural constituencies of Government 
Intelligence. By linking information collection to popular and important 
themes and symbols of political life, the new definition made paperwork an 
attractive vehicle for politicians to discuss the value of privacy, the virtues of 
government restraint, skepticism that bureaucrats know best. Once President 
Ford began to use paperwork reduction as an example of deregulation in 
speeches to business audiences, other elected officials became aware of the 
political possibilities of the issue. Nearly all the candidates in the 1976 presi- 
dential election campaigned against 'big government,' and paperwork reduc- 
tion was an easy way to oppose the excesses of government without 
offending influential beneficiaries of government programs (Cohen 1976). 
Such campaigning also widened public awareness of paperwork as a prob- 
lem, and constituencies for paperwork reduction coalesced. 
Mobilization. Definitions of problems arouse concern and attract attention 
by linking problems to ideologies and values. In turn, ideologies and values 
stimulate and channel activism within government and active efforts to 
influence government from outside. The package of ideas in Paperwork 
Reduction mobilized previously quiescent interests around a set of policy 
proposals, and effectively silenced previously dominant groups. As a result of 
the allocation of blame and credit, the spread of awareness, and the use of 
derogatory language, organized groups outside the federal government 
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(notably interests representing small business, public schools, and large busi- 
ness) were energized and eventually empowered to resist the collection of 
information about their activities by federal agencies. In addition, the Office 
of Management and Budget and the General Accounting Office - agencies 
with government-wide jurisdiction - sought and eventually received in- 
creased control over the information activities of the cabinet departments 
and independent agencies. The losers were agency officials. Their credibility 
in decisions about what information they needed was leached away by the 
Paperwork Reduction definition. Their participation in information policy 
was reduced by the assumptions and theories of the new regime. 
The powers of definition 
Problem definition plays multiple roles in the policy process. The analytical 
role in which definition creates an intellectual framework for further action 
has been especially salient to analysts and scholars. The other two roles - as a 
weapon of advocacy and consensus and as an outcome of policymaking - 
have been less obvious and less well understood. They are  harder to under- 
stand. The intellectual and symbolic contributions of problem definition tend 
to blur into the array of political and institutional forces that also bear on 
policymaking and policy outcomes (Derthick and Quirk, 1985). But difficult 
to measure and understand is not the same as unimportant. At the same time 
that these roles as weapons of advocacy and consensus and as policy out- 
comes pose challenges to researchers, they pose significant opportunities to 
policymakers and significant implications for government action. 
Another theoretical challenge of this conclusion is specifying criteria for 
evaluation. What is a good problem definition? Is Paperwork Reduction 
superior to Government Intelligence? The answer lies in how definitions 
perform as overture, process, and outcome. As overture, Qua@ (1975) 
suggests evaluative criteria such as whether the definition considers the 
whole problem, whether it implies alternatives that have realistic promise of 
improved outcomes, whether it permits systematic analysis of alternatives, 
whether it is clear about the objectives to be achieved, whether it focuses 
attention on a manageable set of factors, and whether the definition is 
meaningful to decision makers. As process, quite different evaluative criteria 
emerge: which actors are mobilized to participate in decision making and 
which are excluded, which actors are placed on the offensive or defensive, 
which institutions are legitimized and strengthened and which are not, which 
groups become more credible and powerful, which decisions are made 
openly in the legislative arena and which are left to bureaucratic discretion. 
As outcome, yet another criterion becomes paramount: which political 
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values are moved forward and which are moved backward. My personal view 
is that the Paperwork Reduction definition is analytically superior to 
Government Intelligence, but that its process and outcome consequences 
have been damaging to values of expertise, rationality, and trust in govern- 
ment that happen to matter to me. Such a conclusion suggests the difficulties 
inherent in evaluating problem definition, and the clarity that may be gained 
by separating the three roles for independent judgment. 
The complexity surrounding these roles should not obscure the central 
point. Problem definition has several kinds of power in the policy process, as 
overture, weapon, and outcome. Deliberation over problem definition is not 
merely the first stage of policy making. It may recur at each successive stage. 
Problem definitions are currents in the stream of political discourse. They 
can be settled, sometimes for many years, facilitating stability and predicta- 
bility in politics, policy and program. They are used by policy entrepreneurs 
to build coalitions, overcoming dissensus and fragmentation. They may be 
challenged and reexamined, undoing consensus as policy proposals wend 
their way through decision making and implementation. Moreover, serious 
attention to a given definition is an outcome of significance, as it legitimates 
some strands of political argument, mobilizes some participants, and invites 
people to see public issues differently. In its multiple roles, problem defini- 
tion constitutes a source of both stability and flexibility in the policy process. 
Notes 
1. I am grateful for support from the Sloan Foundation and the A. Alfred Taubman Center for 
Public Policy and American Institutions at Brown University. An early version of this paper 
was presented at the Conference on Problem Definition in Public Policy at Brown Uni- 
versity. The comments of Thomas Anton, Roger Cobb, Judith Gruber, Donald Kinder, 
James March, and the anonymous reviewers were very helpful. 
2. Problem definition is related to, but different from, agenda setting. Problem definition is 
concerned with the organization of a set of facts, beliefs, and perceptions - how people 
think about circumstances. Agenda setting refers to the process by which some problems 
come to public attention at given times and places. A flashy new definition may facilitate 
the movement of a problem on to the public agenda. But it may not. Many factors other 
than problem definition influence the competition of problems for the attention of policy- 
makers. See, for example, Kingdon (1984). 
3. Select Committees on Small Business held hearings in 1965-66 and in 1971 to rail against 
paperwork. 
4. Representatives Jack Brooks (D, TX) and Frank Horton (R, NY), the chairman and ranking 
minority member of the House Government Operations Committee, have been the major 
players on the House side. In the Senate, Lawton Chiles (D, FL) has been most consistently 
involved, although a number of other Senators on the Committee on Governmental Affairs 
(successor to the Committee on Government Operations) have sponsored bills and taken 
an interest in paperwork. Elmer Staats, then Comptroller General, was heavily involved at 
many points and served on the Commission on Federal Paperwork. 
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5. This does not always work, however. Katzmann (1986) describes a case in which an issue 
network (dealing with mass transportation for physically handicapped passengers) vacil- 
lated between two competing definitions for many years. 
6. Of course, many federal programs and policies and many streams of political rhetoric may 
influence people's judgments about the appropriate role of the government in society 
(Heclo, 1986). Paperwork Reduction is only one. 
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